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Oxford University Press Inc Paperback English

Cyber Persistence Theory

Redefining National Security in Cyberspace

By Emily O. Goldman

Regular price £25.99
Unit price
per

Oxford University Press Inc Paperback English

Cyber Persistence Theory

Redefining National Security in Cyberspace

By Emily O. Goldman

Regular price £25.99
Unit price
per
 
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Delivery expected between Thursday, 11th September to Friday, 12th September
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  • A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.
A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.