The University of Chicago Press Hardback English
False Dawn
The New Deal and the Promise of Recovery, 1933–1947
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A definitive history of the United States recovery from the Great Depressionand the New Deal's true part in it. FDRs New Deal has long enjoyed a special place in American history and policyboth because it redefined the governments fundamental responsibilities and because Roosevelts bold experimentation represented a type of policymaking many would like to see repeated. But the thing about bold experiments, economist George Selgin reminds us, is that they often fail. In False Dawn Selgin draws on both contemporary sources and numerous studies by economic historians to show that, although steps taken during the Roosevelt administrations first days raised hopes of a speedy recovery from the Great Depression, instead of fulfilling those hopes, subsequent New Deal policies proved so counterproductive that over seventeen percent of American workersmore than the peak unemployment rate during the COVID-19 crisiswere still either unemployed or on work relief six years later. By distinguishing the New Deals successes from its failures, and explaining how the U.S. finally managed to lay the specter of mass unemployment to rest, Selgin draws salient lessons for dealing with future recessions.
A definitive history of the United States recovery from the Great Depressionand the New Deal's true part in it.
FDRs New Deal has long enjoyed a special place in American history and policyboth because it redefined the governments fundamental responsibilities and because Roosevelts bold experimentation represented a type of policymaking many would like to see repeated.
But the thing about bold experiments, economist George Selgin reminds us, is that they often fail. In False Dawn Selgin draws on both contemporary sources and numerous studies by economic historians to show that, although steps taken during the Roosevelt administrations first days raised hopes of a speedy recovery from the Great Depression, instead of fulfilling those hopes, subsequent New Deal policies proved so counterproductive that over seventeen percent of American workersmore than the peak unemployment rate during the COVID-19 crisiswere still either unemployed or on work relief six years later.
By distinguishing the New Deals successes from its failures, and explaining how the U.S. finally managed to lay the specter of mass unemployment to rest, Selgin draws salient lessons for dealing with future recessions.